Bác Bush làm em ngứa nghề (Entry for August 23, 2007)

Mr President,

This is what you are quoted by BBC just now as saying yesterday "Just like in Vietnam, if we would leave before the job here [Iraq] is done, these enemies would follow us home" (BBC worldservice 23 Aug.2007).

Don't you think such an analogy is, again, oversimplified ?

And this is what I wrote 3 years ago:

The Gulf is no Vietnam

‘No two wars are alike.’[1] The analogy between Vietnam and the Gulf, therefore, was flawed in many particulars. There are a number of important distinctions between the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and the Vietnam War. The most important one is obvious, that the Vietnam War belonged to the Cold War era while the war in the Persian Gulf was ‘the first post- Cold War crisis.’[2] In the post-Cold War era, ‘the argument over ideology had largely disappeared.’[3] There was little concern about the disposition of the Soviets or the Chinese in the Gulf Crisis as there had been in Vietnam. China’s borders, of course, were not threatened by the US action in Kuwait, and the Soviet Union in 1991 was on the verge of economic and political disintegration. Donaldson observed, ‘for the first time since World War II the United States could initiate a major military intervention outside its own hemisphere without having to fear Communists reprisals, and without the fear that the war might escalate into a nuclear war.’[4] And while the United Nations was made paralyzed during the Vietnam War, the US’s ‘improving relations with Moscow and … satisfactory ones with China’ offered the United Nations an opportunity to ‘correct the failings of the League of Nations’, to put an end to the ‘stalemate’ of the Security Council, and the possibility of the UN Security Council members to work together ‘in forging international unity to oppose Iraq.’[5] The United States did obtain this cooperation and thus had a ‘concert of power’[6] operating under the auspices of the United Nations.

When President Bush said repeatedly that the Gulf War would not be ‘another Vietnam’, what he meant was his administration’s determination overcome the opponents who argued that ‘Iraq was Arabic for Vietnam’[7], envisioning another unpopular, unwinnable war, this time in the desert. ‘Another Vietnam’ was the shorthand for ‘another defeat’. But ‘the Gulf is no Vietnam’ in all dimensions. Retired Colonel Joseph P. Martino of the US Air Force argued that there were no obvious similarities between Vietnam and the the situation in the Gulf in political cause, geographic conditions, historical context, and military circumstances. [8] In his analysis, Martino provided abundant statistical figures and information that strongly supported the contrast the made between Vietnam and the Gulf (Iraq).

The United States intervened in a ‘civil war’[9] in which its side lacked a popular base. The US sought to demonstrate that the war was the result of aggression by one state against another – North Vietnam versus South Vietnam – but could never do so convincingly. In the Gulf there was no doubt that the United States was seeking to reverse a blatant case of aggression. Consequently, whereas with Vietnam the international community was generally dubious of the way the war was both justified and prosecuted, in the Gulf the United States was part of a remarkable United Nations consensus. Vietnam’s awkward terrain of jungles and paddy-fields, its mysterious and determined enemy, and its confused political situation conspired to show up American power at its worst. The Gulf had created perfect conditions to show it off to full effect: open and relatively uninhabited terrain; an enemy prepared to fight a regular battle instead of shifty guerrilla warfare, yet inferior in the quality of both its manpower and is equipment; an aggressor who manifestly fitted the part. When US forces pulled out of Vietnam they were demoralized, almost mutinous, and enjoyed minimal respect at home. The mobilization of forces in Vietnam was based mostly on draftees while in the Gulf War this system was terminated and moved to a volunteer army… On all accounts, the Gulf was no Vietnam. As Freedman and Karsh concluded, ‘the Vietnam analogy was fundamentally misleading.’[10]

Furthermore, ‘Vietnam was a unique historical experience.’[11] Thus, any lesson drawn from Vietnam ‘may have only limited utility in determining the proper course of action in any subsequent scenario.’[12] Meanwhile, ‘there is little agreement on just what the lessons of Vietnam are.’[13] As discussed in Chapter One, President Bush and his predecessor, Ronald Reagan were convinced that the United States would have won in the Vietnam War had the US army not had ‘their hands tied behind backs.’ Both Reagan and Bush spoke of the lessons they drew from the Vietnam experience as if military power had not been used massively in Vietnam. By blaming only the ‘restraint’, if any, on the use of force for the American debacle in Vietnam, those revisionist leaders prevented themselves from ‘facing the truth’ since this hides the real shaping factors behind the Vietnam Syndrome. In his startling mea culpa memoirs, In Retrospect: the Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara identified ‘eleven major causes for our disaster in Vietnam.’[14] These major causes can be grouped into five categories- amounting to misjudgments of America’s adversaries, a failure to grasp the limitations of military power, misjudgments of the American people, misjudgments of international opinion, and general bad management. McNamara believes that pointing out the mistakes ‘allows us to map the lessons of Vietnam, and… to apply them to the post-Cold War world.’[15] McNamara lessons may seem flawed too, but at least it confirmed that there is little agreement on the lessons of Vietnam, even among policy-makers.

Of course, the Gulf War’s success could have rekindled the notion that massive uses of force can be the means to achieve moral, legal and practical interests that serve both the United States and the international community. However, because the nature of the conflict in the Vietnam War was so fundamentally different from that of the Gulf War, the application of this ‘lesson’ to the Gulf would prove to be ‘more the exception than the rule.’[16] When the Vietnam-like situations emerged, the Vietnam Syndrome came alive again.

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[1] Parmet, Herbert S. (2001), George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee, Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick & London, p.477

[2] Hess, Gary R. (2002), op cit, p.153

[3] Borer, Douglas A. (1999), Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared, Frank Cass: London & Portland, Or, p. 212

[4] Donaldson, Gary A. (1996), op cit, p.141

[5] Bush’s memoirs, cited in Hess, Gary R. (2002), op cit, p.162

[6] Simons, Geoff (1998), op cit, p.332

[7] Borer, Douglas A. (1999), op cit, p.211

[8] See Col. Joseph P. Martino (Ret.), Vietnam and Desert Storm: Learning the Right Lessons from Vietnam for the Post-Cold War Era,

website: http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/vietnamcenter/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/lesson.htm

[9] There has never been an agreed name for the Vietnam War. Different people from different political and academic perspectives use different names, such as the Vietnamese resistance against the American imperialism; war by proxies, civil war, American War…. On this point, see, for instance, Lawrence E. Grinter and Perter M. Dunn (eds.) (1987), The American War in Vietnam: Lessons, Legacies, and Implications for Future Conflicts, Green Wood Press: New York and London

[10] Freedman, Lawrence & Karsh, Efraim (1994), op cit, p.283

[11] Borer, Douglas A. (1999), op cit, p.213

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] McNamara, Robert S. (1995), op cit, p.320-3

[15] Ibid., p.324

[16] Jentleson, Bruce W. (2000), op cit, p.284

NHỮNG TÁC ĐỘNG CỦA HỘI CHỨNG VIỆT NAM (Entry for April 13, 2007)

(tiếp theo)

Impacts of Vietnam Syndrome

As the Vietnam War was considered to have resulted in ‘the most divisive and traumatic upheaval in the United States since the Civil War (1861-5),’[1] the profundity of the Vietnam Syndrome was undeniable. The internal cohesion of the nation was torn while the significance of the defeat was monumental in terms of the failure of a policy and technology. Meanwhile, in the post- Vietnam period, the United States was not about to abandon its perceived strategic interest in the world. Hence, ‘potential replicas of Vietnam existed everywhere, and the United States would have to confront them.’[2] No doubt, the Vietnam Syndrome played a major role in shaping the outlook of the American politics and the conduct of the US administrations.

The Vietnam Syndrome, as described earlier, had an immense psychiatric impact which led to attitude of averting interventionism. Indeed, every new military involvement after 1975 evoked the shades of Vietnam. For instance, in the case of Nicaragua, opposition from Congress, some parts of the military and the majority of the public,[3] prevented the Reagan administration from either invading Nicaragua or supporting an anti-government group (the contras) in order to overthrow a hostile government. In Congress, Democrats ‘cried “no more Vietnam”’[4] and Secretary of Defense Weinberger opposed intervention on the ground that it might lead to an ‘involuntary escalation’ akin to that in Vietnam.[5] As Melanson argues, ‘largely because of the limits imposed by fears of another Vietnam, the Reagan administration pursued a policy toward Nicaragua [in the fashion of]… bogus secrecy and limited support for proxies…’[6]

Vietnam Syndrome forced Reagan to take similar measures in Grenada. Anxious to destabilize Maurice Bishop’s Communist regime, but constrained by the American public’s aversion to military intervention, the Reagan administration had resorted to methods such as deterring international investment in Grenada. It was only when Bishop had been assassinated and his regime replaced by the Revolutionary Military Council, which instigated a curfew, that the administration seized its opportunity. On the pretext of rescuing the 1,000 American medical students in Grenada, Reagan was able to authorize a military invasion, which took place on 25 October 1983 and lasted only three days. Initially, most Democrats and some Republicans in Congress were against Reagan’s action, introducing a resolution to invoke the 1973 War Powers Act. They only agreed to lend their support to the President when success of the operation and the minimal number of American casualties became apparent. This was described by Mueller as a ‘rally-round-the flag’[7] effect, in which the public rallies around the President in patriotic support during the initial stages of military intervention. The support, however, declines should the war gets protracted since this effect will soon be superseded by the Vietnam Syndrome.

Parallel to the psychiatric malaise, the Vietnam Syndrome had its practical consequence which led to attempts to restore national confidence and to avert the syndrome itself. In fact, every president, upon his taking office, set for himself the goal of dispelling the shades of Vietnam. President Gerald Ford firmly believed that ‘lessons of the past of Vietnam have already been learned- learned by presidents, learned by Congress, learned by American people.’[8] With that in mind, Ford and many Americans looked upon his handling of the incident, which happened on May 12, 1975 when US merchant ship SS Mayaguez was seized by Khmer Rouge gunboats near the Cambodian-held island of Pulou Wei, as the greatest political victory of his administration and considered that it contributed to the healing of the nation that the president deemed his most important priority. Despite the remaining questions and anxieties about the Mayaguez crisis[9] and the moral legitimacy of US foreign policy, Ford felt confident in his belief that ‘the American people are getting out from under the trauma of our problems in Vietnam.’[10] Ford recalled in his memoirs that ‘the gloomy national mood began to fade.’ He believed that ‘many people’s faith in their country was restored.’[11]

In his first significant foreign policy speech as president, given at the University of Notre Dame, Jimmy Carter observed, ‘the Vietnamese War produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our policy and our system of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our leaders.’[12] While acknowledging that his predecessor had done much to begin ‘to heal our land,’[13] Carter had made clear throughout his election campaign that he did not believe Ford’s administration had done enough to restore American confidence. Therefore, Carter was determined that his administration’s foreign policy should be as open and accountable as possible. Above all, Carter found it ‘urgent to restore the moral bearings of American foreign policy.’[14] Carter committed his administration to building ‘international policies which reflect our own precious values.’ This would ensure a revival of American self-confidence and provide the rest of the world with ‘affirmation of our Nation’s continuing moral strength and our belief in an undiminished, ever-expanding American dream.’[15]

By the time of the 1980 election, 83% of Americans agreed that Carter was ‘a man of high moral principles.’ However, less than a third of those polled believed that Carter was capable of translating his principles into policies that could move the nation forward. Only 31% believed that Carter had ‘strong leadership qualities.’[16] What the American wanted and needed was someone who personified strength and confidence. To find such leadership they turned to the retired Hollywood actor and former governor of California, Ronald Reagan. The main objective of Reagan’s foreign policy was to restore the United States’ national pride and strength and one of the goals the Reagan administration set out in order to achieve this end was to restore faith and pride in the US military by redefining the Vietnam War and restoring the willingness to employ force abroad. As early as his first Inaugural Address, Reagan included Vietnam in a list of places where American heroes had fallen to preserve the principles of their nation. In honor of the Vietnam veterans, Reagan made clear that ‘no one should doubt the nobility of the effort they made.’[17]

Despite his rhetoric, however, Reagan was not able to lay to rest the ghosts of Vietnam. Through his rehabilitation of the Vietnam veteran and his willingness to talk about the war, Reagan did contribute to a process of coming to terms with the Vietnam War that occupied much of American thought and popular culture throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. But as McCrisken points out, ‘in his determination to finally put Vietnam behind Americans, Reagan offered an unrealistic reinterpretation of the war that diminished the importance and significance of many of the debates over the meaning and consequences of Vietnam and its effects on American society.’[18] Reagan himself also showed the ambivalence when, one the one hand, he declared that the success of the American invasion of Grenada had “reversed the Vietnam Syndrome”, and on the other, stated the success in Grenada did not mean that the US would now apply military force elsewhere because ‘I can’t foresee any situation that has exactly the same things that this one had.’[19] As Arnold Isaacs has observed ‘the real war in Vietnam was… more complicated and more ambiguous than Ronald Reagan ever seemed to understand. And so was the task of vanquishing Vietnam’s legacy.’[20]

So if this task of ‘vanquishing’ the Vietnam Syndrome had not been fulfilled under the Reagan administration, it had to be handed over to the succeeding administration. How did the syndrome come to govern the conduct of the Bush administration during the Gulf Crisis? Was the syndrome finally kicked once and for all? These questions will be answered in the next chapters of the thesis.

(Hết Chương Một)

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[1] Simons, Geoff (1998), op cit, p. xvii

[2] Kolko, Gabriel (1994), op cit, p.538

[3] Melanson, Richard (1991), Reconstructing Consensus: America Since the Vietnam War, New York: St Martin’s Press, p.154

[4] Moss, George Donelson (2002), op cit, p.444

[5] Melanson, Richard (1991), op cit, p.177

[6] Ibid., pp.175-5

[7] see Mueller, John E. (1973), War, Presidents and Public Opinion, New York and London: Wiley

[8] Ford, ‘The President’s News Conference of May 6, 1975,’ Public Papers, 1973, p.641, cited in McCrisken, Trevor B. (2003), op cit, p.47

[9] For more information on the Mayaguez incident, see McCrisken, Trevor B. (2003), op cit, pp.46-53

[10] Ford, ‘Interview with European Journalists, May 23, 1975,’ Public Papers, 1975, cited in McCrisken, Trevor B. (2003), op cit, p.53

[11] Ford, Gerald R. (1979), ‘A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford’, New York: Harper & Row, Ibid.

[12] Carter, ‘University of Notre Dame: Address at Commencement Exercises at the University’, May 22 1977, Public Papers 1977, Ibid, p.57

[13] Carter, ‘Inaugural Address of President Jimmy Carter, January 20, 1977’, Public Papers, 1977, Ibid, p. 56

[14] Public Papers, 1977, Ibid, p.57

[15] Ibid.

[16] Morris, Kenneth E. (1996), Jimmy Carter: American Moralist, Athens, GA and London: University of Georgia Press, p.287

[17] Reagan, ‘Proclamation 4841- National Day of Recognition for Veterans of the Vietnam Era, April 23, 1981’, Public Papers, Ibid., p.103

[18] McCrisken, Trevor B. (2003), op cit, p.104

[19] Reagan, ‘Appointment of Donald Rumsfeld,’ Ibid., p.119.

[20] Isaacs, Arnold R. (1997), Vietnam Shadows: The War, Its Ghosts, and Its Legacy, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.49